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Bargaining Power and
Background Law
Nancy S. Kim*
ABSTRACT
Power in contract law typically refers to the bargaining strength
of each contracting party in relation to the other. In assessing the
relative bargaining power of each party, courts and commentators often
consider factors specific to the parties, such as socio-economic status
and education level. In this Essay, I suggest another factor that affects
the power of the parties in negotiating or modifying their agreement,
one that I refer to as the "background law." The background law is the
substantive law that governs the subject matter of the contract. This
Essay focuses specifically on the background law of copyrights and the
way it alters and affects the allocation of power between contracting
parties. In certain circumstances, the background law of copyright has
the potential to create or exacerbate two kinds of power imbalance-
knowledge power and market power. In this Essay, "knowledge power"
refers to the advantage that a superior understanding of the
background law confers upon a contracting party, and "market power"
refers to the ability of a contracting party to establish and dictate
business norms in a particular segment of the economy or within a
particular industry. This Essay focuses on three bargaining pairs in
order to explore how copyright law as background law can create
knowledge and market power imbalances: (1) independent artist and
hiring party, (2) employee and employer, and (3) software company and
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consumer. The first two bargaining pairs involve the work-made-for-
hire doctrine. The third bargaining pair involves innovative
contracting forms and the freedom to contract. Part I examines
knowledge power imbalances using as examples the first two
bargaining pairs. Part II analyzes market power imbalances using as
an example the third bargaining pair.
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Power in contract relations typically refers to the bargaining
strength of each contracting party in relation to the other.1  In
assessing the relative bargaining power of each party, courts and
commentators often consider factors specific to the parties, such as
socio-economic status and education level.2  This Essay suggests
another factor that affects the power of the parties in negotiating or
modifying their agreement, one that it refers to as the "background
law." The background law is the substantive law that governs the
subject matter of the contract. This Essay focuses specifically on the
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) (noting that a bargain is
"not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even
because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party").
2. See, e.g., Weaver v. Amer. Oil Co., 276 N.E. 2d 144, at 145-46 (1971) (noting that the
plaintiff was the party with 'lesser bargaining power" had 'left high school after one and a half
years and. . . work[ed] at various skilled and unskilled labor oriented jobs. He was not one who
should be expected to know the law or understand the meaning of technical terms.").
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background law of copyrights and the way it alters and affects the
allocation of power between contracting parties.
Copyright law grants authors a limited monopoly on their
creations in an effort to spur innovation for the benefit of the public.3
This monopoly is a bundle of rights that the copyright owner can
transfer, in whole or in part, via contract. 4 The interplay between
contract law and copyright law creates power and shifts rights
between the parties, sometimes with unintended consequences.
In certain circumstances, the background law of copyright has
the potential to create or exacerbate two kinds of power imbalance-
knowledge power and market power. In this Essay, "knowledge
power" refers to the advantage that a superior understanding of the
background law confers upon a contracting party. This knowledge
allows a party to protect or expand his or her contractual rights and to
limit his or her contractual obligations. For example, many
consumers lack knowledge power in that they do not realize that the
"limited warranty" they receive from some product manufacturers
actually reduces their rights under the Uniform Commercial Code.5 In
other words, a knowledge power imbalance occurs where one party's
lack of knowledge effectively gives the other party an unnegotiated
advantage. 6 While these imbalances occur in many contexts, this
Essay limits its discussion of knowledge power imbalance to the
context of copyright law. The rights allocated by copyright law do not
always accord with the reasonable expectations of a party to a contract
who lacks knowledge of copyright law.
For purposes of this Essay, the term "market power" refers to
the ability of a contracting party to establish and dictate business
norms in a particular segment of the economy or within a particular
industry. For example, even if a consumer is aware of the warranties
implied by state law, he or she may be unable to preserve applicable
rights under these warranties if most manufacturers of that type of
product provide only limited warranties.7  In that situation, no
3. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting the
objective of copyright law to stimulate artistic production for the "general public good").
4. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990)
(referring to the copyright holder's rights as a "bundle" of rights).
5. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2004) (providing an implied warranty that goods shall be
merchantable); id. § 2-711 (setting forth Buyer's remedies in event of breach by Seller).
6. In some cases, such as the example regarding warranties, the other party may have
intended the contractual result achieved. In other cases, however, the other party is equally
unaware of the background law but nevertheless benefits from its effects.
7. See Addison Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576, 580 (1969) (noting
that consumers effectively have no choice to seek different warranty terms because all competing
goods in that category are similarly limited).
2009]
VANDERBILTJ. OFENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 12:1:93
amount of knowledge of background law can surmount the market
power of the manufacturer.
The alienability of copyright through contract increases the
economic value of the exclusive rights granted under copyright, thus
providing an incentive to create.8 Yet, in some segments of the
economy, the market power of one bargaining entity is much greater
than the market power of the other, thus enabling the stronger party
to diminish or effectively eliminate the economic value of the
copyright.9 For example, as further discussed in Part II, a large
software company has greater market power than any of its individual
consumers. This imbalance in market power can create dynamics that
undermine the incentive objective of copyright law. 10
This Essay focuses on three bargaining pairs in order to
explore how copyright law as background law can create knowledge
and market power imbalances: (1) independent artist and hiring
party, (2) employee and employer, and (3) software company and
consumer. The first two bargaining pairs involve the work-made-for-
hire doctrine.11  The third bargaining pair involves innovative
contracting forms and the freedom to contract. Part I examines
knowledge power imbalances using the first two bargaining pairs as
examples. Part II analyzes market power imbalances using the third
bargaining pair as the example.
I. KNOWLEDGE POWER IMBALANCES
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, a creator typically owns the
rights to his or her work upon creation of that work, except where the
work was "made for hire."12 A work made for hire is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.1 3
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2000).
12. Id. § 201(a).
13. Id. § 101 (noting that a "supplementary work' is a work prepared for publication as a
secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding,
illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work,
such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes,
musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and
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Thus, the work-made-for-hire doctrine creates two exceptions to the
typical ownership rule under the Copyright Act: (1) when the creator
is an employee and makes the creation during the scope of the
employment and (2) when the creator is an independent contractor
hired to create a specific type of work for another party pursuant to
written agreement. 14 The work-made-for-hire doctrine tries to strike a
balance between acknowledging creativity and rewarding those who
take an economic risk in order to acquire the fruits of that creativity.15
Problems arise, however, for three reasons: (1) not all creations qualify
as works-only those that fall into the statutorily enumerated
categories; (2) not all hiring parties know that they must have
independent contractors sign a work-made-for-hire agreement if they
wish to acquire the copyright; and (3) in cases where a work does not
fall under one of the statutorily enumerated categories of a work made
for hire, some hiring parties may not know that they must include
assignment provisions in their work-made-for-hire agreements if they
wish to own the copyright to the work. 16 As a result, parties may
believe that they own the copyright to a creation when they do not.
A. Independent Artist and Hiring Party
The bargaining pair of an independent artist and a wealthy-
usually corporate-hiring party is what many people envision when
considering a creator's ability to contract away some or all of his or her
exclusive rights. Examples of this type of bargaining pair include a
painter commissioned to paint a wealthy patron's portrait, a musician
assigning his or her rights to a recording, or a writer hired to write a
screenplay for a production company. Typically, the hiring party and
the creator enter into a written agreement setting forth the terms of
the engagement, including the price, the specifications for the work,
and the ownership of intellectual property rights.
The work-made-for-hire doctrine determines who owns the
copyright to a work and permits the parties to reallocate some or all of
an 'instructional text' is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with
the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities").
14. Id.
15. Julie Katzman, Note, Joint Authorship of Commissioned Works, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
867, 871-72 (1989) (noting that the 1976 Copyright Act aimed to balance the interests of authors
and artists against the interests of hiring parties).
16. The courts have not yet resolved whether a creator can effectively assign rights to a
work that has not yet been created and does not fall into one of the statutorily enumerated
categories of works made for hire. The author would argue that such an assignment is
enforceable as a conditional promise under contract law provided that present tense assignment
language was employed.
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their statutory rights with a written contract.1 7 Contract law in turn
strives to fulfill the parties' reasonable expectations of the agreement's
terms.18 Knowledge imbalances, however, may operate in a given
contract to defeat these reasonable expectations. The following two
scenarios illustrate the resulting discrepancy between the parties'
intentions and the contractual result.
1. Scenario 1: Nonprofit Organization and Sculptor
A nonprofit organization, unaware of the work-made-for-hire
doctrine and the background law of copyright, hires a sculptor to make
a sculpture of homeless people.1 9 The organization intends to make
miniature replicas of the sculpture to publicize its mission to assist
the homeless. 20 The sculptor is not an employee of the non-profit
organization and the organization does not have the sculptor sign a
written work-made-for-hire agreement. 21 Even if the parties had
signed such an agreement, a sculpture does not fall into one of the
statutorily enumerated categories of works made for hire.22 The
copyright to the sculpture thus belongs to the sculptor. 23 As a result,
the non-profit organization cannot make miniature replicas of the
sculpture to publicize its mission because the right to make and
distribute copies are exclusive rights held by the copyright owner
under the Copyright Act. 24
2. Scenario 2: Bank and Software Consultant
A bank hires a software consultant as an independent
contractor to install a complicated software system that the bank
previously purchased from another company. 25  During the
17. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201.
18. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (1952) ("That portion of the
field of law that is classified and described as the law of contracts attempts the realization of
reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise."); Roscoe Pound,
Individual Interests of Substance-Promised Advantages, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1945).
19. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 752.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 738.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
24. Id. § 106 (1), (3).
25. This scenario is the topic of discussion on several software developer websites. See,
e.g., Posting of Cliff to Slashdot (Copyright vs Exclusive License?), http://ask.slashdot.org/story/
07/04/26/0433218/Copyright.vs-Exclusive-License?artpos=3 (Apr. 26, 2007, 14:21 EST); Posting
of Ryan Wilson to http://discuss.joelonsoftware.comldefault.asp?biz.5.736364.4 (Work Made for
Hire Agreement) (Feb. 27, 2009).
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engagement, the consultant creates an interface between the bank's
existing system and the new software. 26 The consultant has signed
the bank's standard work-made-for-hire agreement, which includes
both a provision stating that the work is a work made for hire and a
provision assigning the copyright to the hiring party in the event that
the work does not constitute a work made for hire, such as the
following:
All Deliverables shall be considered a work made for hire and ownership of all rights,
including all copyrights and renewals and extensions thereof, shall vest in the
Company. In the event that any such Deliverable is deemed not to be a work made for
hire for any reason, Consultant hereby irrevocably grants, transfers and assigns all
right, title and interest in such Deliverable to Company. Consultant hereby waives any
moral rights that it may have in and to the Deliverable. 2 7
To the uninformed, the phrase "work made for hire" sounds like it
means only that the consultant will be engaged to do work, and that
the bank will pay her for it.28 Still, even though the consultant does
not understand that "work made for hire" has a particular legal
meaning, she signs the agreement (with the assignment provision)
and thereby transfers the copyright to the new interface to the bank.
Subsequently, the consultant may create the same software interface
for other clients, unaware that she is exposing herself-and them-to
infringement claims by the bank. Of course, the bank is unlikely to
notice or object to the infringement until the context changes-i.e., the
consultant creates a software interface for a competitor of the bank,
the bank has a conflict or disagreement with the consultant (or one of
the consultant's clients), or the interface suddenly becomes more
valuable as a result of a change in the availability of the technology.
3. Knowledge Power and Bargaining Behavior
As these scenarios illustrate, the background law of copyright
and the work-made-for-hire doctrine have the potential to create a
knowledge power imbalance that defeats the reasonable expectations
of the parties. In Scenario 1, if the sculptor does not consent to the
non-profit's creation and distribution of replicas of the sculpture, that
imbalance defeats the non-profit organization's purpose for
26. Id.
27. The interface likely does not fall into one of the statutorily enumerated work-made-
for-hire categories, but the assignment provision closes the gap and effectively transfers
copyright to the bank.
28. The author was formerly in-house counsel at a software and services company and
had many discussions with different software consultants who thought "work made for hire"
meant simply that they were getting paid to do the work, not that they were being asked to give
up the copyright to the work.
2009]
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 12:1:93
commissioning the work. In Scenario 2, the knowledge imbalance
threatens the very existence of the consultant's business.
How would knowledge of the background law change the
behavior of the bargaining pairs? In Scenario 1, if the non-profit
organization knew the background law of copyright, it would certainly
insist upon a written assignment of rights prior to commissioning the
sculpture. The sculptor, on the other hand, might (1) insist upon
contractual language preserving certain rights to the work, such as
requiring consent to any alterations, (2) request more money to
compensate for the loss of rights, or (3) refuse to accept the project. In
Scenario 2, the consultant could (1) insist upon contractual language
that enables her to retain ownership of the interface and gives the
bank a perpetual, non-exclusive license to use it, (2) charge
development fees much higher than consulting fees, thus factoring
the inability to reuse the code into pricing, or (3) decline to accept the
project. In both scenarios, the background law creates a potential
knowledge power imbalance that may change what the parties
thought they were agreeing to into something that neither of them
intended.
B. Employee and Employer
The work-made-for-hire doctrine treats employees differently
from independent contractors. 29 Under the Copyright Act of 1976,
in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all the rights
comprised in the copyright.3 0
Thus, all of the copyrightable work that an employee creates within
the scope of his employment is a work made for hire, and the employer
therefore owns it. Unlike with independent contractors, this provision
affects all work by an employee, not just the type of work that falls
into the statutorily enumerated categories. 31 Usually, the statutory
allocation of ownership reflects the expectations of the parties.32
Sometimes, however, it does not.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) (defining work for hire as "a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment").
30. Id. § 201(b).
31. Id.
32. This is not to say that those expectations are based upon principles of fairness-
rather than the imbalance of power between employees and employers-even when the parties
intend the work-made-for-hire doctrine to apply. As noted copyright scholar and law professor
Jane Ginsburg notes, "[e]mployee authors and others subject to the 'works made for hire rule' are
cast out of copyright, as the statute deems their employers and hiring parties the 'author."' Jane
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1. Scenario 3: "Creative Genius" and Eponymous Companies
The legendary choreographer Martha Graham created an
eponymous dance company which was incorporated in 1948 after
several decades of operation. 33 Although Graham was an employee of
the company, the purpose of the company was to handle the business-
related aspects of dance education and production (such as hiring
dancers and reviewing requests to perform dances) so that she could
focus on the creative aspects of her work. 34 Upon Graham's death, the
heir to her estate sued the dance company, claiming ownership of
seventy dances that Graham had created. 35 The dance company
countered that because it was Graham's employer, it-not Graham-
owned the dances under the work-made-for-hire doctrine.36  The
Second Circuit agreed and held that all of the dances that Graham
created while employed by the dance company were works made for
hire and therefore owned by the company. 37
The Graham decision created a stir within the dance
community. Merce Cunningham, the late visionary choreographer
and contemporary of Graham, said that he was "horrified" to discover
that, based on the Graham decision, he might not have any say in how
his dances were performed.38 His concern regarding the potential loss
of creative control over his work was justified.39 If found by a court to
be an employee of his company-which is probable given the court's
analysis in Graham-it would not matter that Cunningham's
company, like Graham's, existed solely to promote his artistic vision.40
Despite the intentions of Cunningham and his dance company, the
work-made-for-hire doctrine dictates that the employee-
C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLuM. L. REV.
1613, 1645 (2001). Sometimes creators who retain authorship status nonetheless assign all
rights for a small royalty, or even a flat one-time payment. Id. at 1646.
33. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004). There was actually a school and a dance center, but for
the purposes of this discussion and the sake of simplicity, I will refer to only a "dance company."
34. Id. at 639-40 (noting that the "employer" was a not-for-profit corporation formed for
the purpose of encouraging an artist in her creative endeavors).
35. Id. at 630.
36. Id. at 631.
37. Id. at 642.
38. Diane Solway, When the Choreographer Is Out of the Picture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/07/arts/dance/07solw.html.
39. See Arthur Lubow, Can Modern Dance be Preserved?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at
MM38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/magazine/08cunningham-t.html ("In the
aftermath of the [Graham] decision, single-choreographer companies realized that if the artist
was to own his or her dances with certainty, the rights had to be granted formally by the
board.").
40. Id.
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choreographer's creations would belong to the company. 41 In the event
of a dispute, the employer-company could replace Cunningham with
an artistic director who interprets and performs the dances created by
the employee-choreographer in a manner that subverts, perverts, and
destroys his artistic vision. The work-made-for-hire doctrine, as
applied and interpreted in Graham, fails to address the reality of
many artistic relationships and imposes on them a more traditional
and typical type of working arrangement-one with a boss, cubicles,
and nine-to-five working hours.
2. Scenario 4: Academics and Universities
Few doubt that full-time professors are employees of their
academic institutions. 42 Yet hardly anyone thinks that professors are
mere scribes for hire or that the work they do belongs to the schools
that pay them. In fact, some courts have recognized a "teacher
exception" to the work-made-for-hire doctrine that enables professors
to retain the copyright to their lectures and scholarly works. 43 These
cases, however, were largely decided prior to the enactment of the
1976 Act which classified work prepared by an employee within the
scope of employment as "work made for hire."44 A case rendered in
1987 hinted that academic work would constitute a work made for
41. After the Graham decision, Merce Cunningham's dance foundation began registering
the copyrights to his dances in his name. Id.
42. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the Supreme Court applied
common law principles of agency to determine whether a worker was an independent contractor
or an employee. 490 U.S. 730, 751-53 (1989). See also Gregory Kent Laughlin, Who Owns the
Copyright to Faculty-Created Web Sites?: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine's Applicability to Internet
Resources Created for Distance Learning and Traditional Classroom Courses, 41 B.C.L. REV. 549,
572-73 (2000) (noting that, using agency principles, professors would almost certainly be
considered employees of their university).
43. See, e.g., Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). For a discussion
of the teacher exception and cases, see Jed Scully, The Virtual Professorship: Intellectual
Property Ownership of Academic Work in a Digital Era, 35 McGEORGE L. REV. 227 (2004);
Elizabeth Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing "Teacher Exception," or
Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century University, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209 (2003);
Chanani Sandier, Comment, Copyright Ownership: A Fundamental of "Academic Freedom," 12
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 231, 239 (2001).
44. See, e.g., Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542. Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss writes that
[s]cholars have indeed concluded that that 1976 Act abolishes the teacher exception to
the work for hire doctrine. They reason that since the 1976 Act suggest that courts
should limit their inquiry to the existence of an employment relationship, employees.
• . such as academics . . .may no longer argue that the factors surrounding their
employment rebut the presumption of employer ownership.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 590, 598-99 (1987).
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hire under the 1976 Copyright Act. 45 Several scholars, too, believe
that the 1976 Copyright Act-which focuses on whether work is
created within the scope of employment-effectively abolished the
teacher exception.46 Generally, universities did not bother to initiate
litigation against their professor-employees or to contest the teacher
exception that existed prior to 1976. 47  Instead, the cases that
discussed the issue of ownership of academic work typically arose
because of a dispute between a professor and a third party who, for
example, tried to sell lecture notes.48
A teacher exception, previously justified by the uniquely
itinerant nature of academia, is difficult to rationalize in an
increasingly mobile marketplace where many types of employees-not
just academics-move around from employer to employer. The work-
made-for-hire doctrine may thus betray the reasonable expectations of
an employee-academic who believes that she owns the rights to her
scholarship. As in previous scenarios, this gap in understanding is
usually not a problem until changes in the business environment-or
technological innovations-change the context and meaning of the
agreement. Long-distance learning, for example, has made the
question of who owns academic work a more contentious issue-just
ask Professor Arthur Miller. A few years ago, Professor Miller agreed
to offer online courses for Concord Law School, a distance learning
institution.49 Harvard University, Miller's then-employer, claimed
that he could not offer these courses because it owned his lecture
materials. 50 Eventually, the parties settled the matter, and Miller
agreed to give up teaching his Concord courses. 51  Harvard
subsequently modified its faculty manual to explicitly forbid faculty
45. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
work-for-hire doctrine is "general enough to make every academic article a 'work for hire' and
therefore vest exclusive control in universities rather than scholars").
46. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 44; Scully, supra note 43. Elizabeth Townsend
explains that the "teacher exception was established under the 1909 act by case law, but because
the 1976 act did not incorporate it, the 'teacher exception' was subsumed by a work-for-hire
doctrine that the Supreme Court's definition of employment in CCVN v. Reid places teachers'
materials under the scope of employment." Townsend, supra note 43, at 226.
47. For an analysis of cases discussing the teacher exception in the information age, see
Townsend, supra note 43.
48. See, e.g., Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542; see also Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412,
416 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the 1976 Act likely abolished the teacher exception, even if it did
so inadvertently).
49. Amy Dockser Marcus, Seeing Crimson: Why Harvard Law Wants to Rein In One of
Its Star Professors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at Al.
50. Id.
51. Jay Lindsay, Harvard Corrals Its Staff, AUSTRALIAN, May 3, 2000, at 40.
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members from teaching or consulting outside of Harvard, either in
person or online, without the appropriate dean's permission.52
Knowledge of the work-made-for-hire doctrine gives the
employer power in the form of ownership of the work without having
to bargain for it. In the Miller example, technology changed the
business environment, and suddenly teaching materials that
previously had no independent market value became valuable. Miller,
believing he owned the copyright, attempted to exploit the new value
of his work product. His employer, however, claimed that it owned the
copyright to Miller's lectures and that either Miller should be enjoined
from working for Concord or Harvard should receive a portion of the
revenues from those lectures.5 3 The parties may have been able to
come to a mutually agreeable resolution if they had contemplated the
future business landscape prior to entering into the contract. 54 The
background law, however, acted as a contractual "gap filler"55 after the
business environment changed, putting Miller at a negotiating
disadvantage that he was ultimately unable to overcome.
C. Contract Interpretation and the Knowledge Imbalance
Copyright law permits a copyright holder to contractually alter
the exclusive rights granted by statute. Unfortunately, as discussed
in Section I, the existing background law-in these scenarios, the
work-made-for-hire doctrine of the 1976 Copyright Act-has the
potential to create a knowledge gap. The non-intuitive nature of the
statutory requirements under the Copyright Act generally, and the
work-made-for-hire provisions specifically, affect the allocation of
rights between the parties that may defeat the intent of at least one of
52. Robert E. Oliphant, Will Internet Driven Concord University Law School
Revolutionize Traditional Law School Teaching?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 841, 849-50 (2000).
Professor Miller was quoted as saying, "Now I have to justify everything I do. I find it offensive I
now have to go through a process I haven't had to go through in 35 years." Lindsay, supra note
51. The policy, Miller said, offended the principle of academic freedom: "The question is whether
my contract bounds me exclusively to Harvard [L]aw [S]chool or whether I have free choice." Id.
53. Sandler, supra note 43, at 232. Harvard also claimed that Miller's lectures for
Concord would be a conflict of interest with Harvard. Id.
54. Professor Miller indicated that an amicable resolution could have been reached if the
issue had been broached earlier. "'My mistake,' Mr. Miller now concedes, 'was I didn't get front-
end permission from the dean' before the controversy boiled up. But he says that's because 'I
have been doing videotape and audiotape lectures of my courses for 25 years and didn't think
this was any different."' Amy Dockser Marcus, Seeing Crimson: Why Harvard Law Wants to
Rein In One of Its Star Professors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at Al.
55. "Gap filler" refers to terms that are supplied by a court regarding issues that the
parties to a contract have failed to expressly address. See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, What to
Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 323 (2004).
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the parties to a contract. Because this problem arises from a lack of
knowledge of the background law, the best solution is to minimize the
need for specialized knowledge of copyright law.56
Currently, the work-made-for-hire doctrine is absolutist in
nature-either the hiring party owns the work or the creator owns it. 51
In many cases, however, each party intends to use the work
independently of the other but anticipates the other party's intended
use of the work, either because such use was discussed or because
such use was to be expected given the nature of the work.
Unfortunately, the work-made-for-hire doctrine does not recognize or
consider context, trade norms, or the intent of the parties in entering
into the agreement.
Consequently, Congress should amend the work-made-for-hire
doctrine to expressly permit courts to interpret the provisions of an
agreement to include context, industry norms, and the intent of the
parties. Courts may then determine whether one party had intended
to grant the other party an implied license to use the work and, if so,
what the scope of that implied license is.58 For example, in Scenario 1,
where the contracting parties were a non-profit organization and a
sculptor, if the sculptor had been aware of the non-profit
organization's intent to create replicas of the sculpture, a court might
determine that the sculptor had granted an implied license to the non-
profit organization to make and distribute copies of the sculpture even
though copyright ownership would reside with the sculptor. This
would serve the interests and expectations of both parties. The non-
profit organization would not be able to alter or modify the sculpture,
but it would be permitted to make and distribute miniature replicas,
thus fulfilling both parties' contractual expectations.
56. One might suggest that parties remedy knowledge power imbalances through
education, but such a suggestion is impractical and ignores the nature of knowledge power
imbalances. The problem with suggesting education as a solution is that (unlike with economic
or market imbalance situations) in knowledge imbalance cases, the affected party is entirely
unaware of the need for education.
57. See Nancy S. Kim, Martha Graham, Professor Miller and the "Work for Hire"
Doctrine: Undoing the Judicial Bind Created by the Legislature, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 337, 367
(2006) (noting the "pitfalls inherent in an all-or-nothing approach to ownership of created
works").
58. See id. (stating that the "intent of the parties should be the single most important
factor to consider in determining ownership").
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II. MARKET POWER IMBALANCES
The third bargaining pair-the software company59  and
consumer-illustrates how market power imbalance, like knowledge
power imbalance, can undermine the incentive objective of copyright
law. Software companies have used their market power to introduce
novel forms of contracts, such as "shrinkwraps," 60 "clickwraps,"61 and
"browsewraps,62 into the marketplace, 63 and courts have recognized
these contracting forms as legitimate. 64 Software companies have
then reallocated by contract the rights granted to the creator by the
background law of copyright, 65 which may ultimately undermine the
incentive objective of the Copyright Act.
A. Software Company and Consumer
The objective of copyright is to encourage invention and
innovation for the benefit of society.66 Copyright law gives ownership
59. In this Essay, the term "software company," includes owners of websites.
60. A shrinkwrap license is an agreement that is wrapped in plastic and included with a
compact disc containing a software program. See Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L.
REV. 797, 799 (2007) [hereinafter Kim, Clicking and Cringing]; Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (1995).
61. A clickwrap agreement is a digital agreement that requires a party to click on an
electronic button to indicate assent. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459,
459 (2006) [hereinafter Lemley, Terms of Use].
62. Browsewrap agreements are terms posted on a website that do not require an
express manifestation of assent but typically are subject to a notice requirement in order to be
enforceable. See Kim, Clicking and Cringing, supra note 60, at 846-47; see also Robert L. Oakley,
Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS.
L. REV. 1041, 1049-50 (noting that software producers first used shrinkwrap licenses, but "as the
technology has evolved, the licenses have evolved along with it to include so-called clickwrap
licenses" and that "[browsewrap licenses were added as the Internet developed with its ability to
create hyperlinks that would take a customer to a license agreement at another location").
63. See discussion infra Part II.A.
64. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 430-32 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing
browsewrap agreements with notice); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260-61 (6th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing clickwrap agreements); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448
(7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing shrinkwrap agreements); see also Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc.,
320 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics,
Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (W.D. Pa. 2000). But see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech.,
939 F.2d 91, 100-03 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding a "box-top" license invalid under the Uniform
Commercial Code).
65. See discussion infra Part II.A.
66. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
work."); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting the ultimate
aim of copyright law is to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good").
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of software to its actual creators (provided, of course, that the software
was not work made for hire).67 With ownership of software comes
exclusive rights, including the right to assign, sell, and transfer these
rights, either in whole or in part.68 Owners can also license the right
to use the software and place limitations on such use.69 Copyright law
enables authors to exchange some or all of these exclusive rights with
a written agreement.70
When the public envisions a creator, it tends to think of an
individual or an artist, not a corporation or an industry. In reality,
creators may be people or entities, such as a software company. The
final bargaining pair involves a software company and a consumer.
Software companies control their product, including its marketing and
use by consumers, 71 and they sell the use of the software through a
license conveyed by a contract. Software companies began licensing-
rather than selling-their products because the background law gave
software creators exclusive ownership of the product and the
flexibility to grant use rights.7 2 In other words, copyright gave market
power to software producers who were then able to set the terms of
software transactions through contracts with end users.73
67. In 1964, the U.S. Copyright Office permitted copyright registration on computer
programs. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 488-99 (1995) (discussing
the availability of copyright protection for software); Note, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1274 (1964).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000) (permitting ownership of a copyright to be "transferred in
whole or in part"); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (referring to the copyright
owner's rights as a "bundle of exclusive rights").
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
70. See id. § 204(a) (noting that a "transfer of copyright ownership, other than by
operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of
the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owners of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly
authorized agent"). One commentator has noted that contracts may serve as substitutes for
physical barriers. See Jeff C. Dodd, Time and Assent in the Formation of Information Contracts:
The Mischief of Applying Article 2 to Information Contracts, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 195, 216-18 (1999).
71. Individual programmers may code software, but corporations often own the software
by virtue of the work-made-for-hire doctrine and/or assignment agreements. See discussion supra
Part I.
72. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market
Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 341-53 (1996)
(explaining the benefits of mass-market end user license agreements for software publishers);
Oakley, supra note 62, at 1048-49 (discussing how, due to the "considerable uncertainty ...
about the scope of copyright protection for computer software," software producers began to use
shrinkwrap licenses to protect their rights).
73. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
validity of a shrinkwrap license of software); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330,
1333-34 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that software was licensed rather than sold).
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Consequently, software producers introduced a new method 74 of
publicly distributing consumer products without selling them.75
Unlike in other industries where manufacturers relinquish first sale
and associated rights 76 to an individual item at the time of sale, a
software owner instead relinquishes only some of its rights through
licensing agreements with software users, and retains those other
rights that vendors typically transfer along with physical possession. 77
For example, one who has purchased a copy of a work may resell or
transfer that copy, whereas a licensee of a work is subject to the terms
of the license agreement (and software license agreements typically
restrict resale or transfer of copies of software). 78 Furthermore, an
owner of a copy of a computer program may make or authorize the
creation of another copy for certain limited purposes, 79 whereas a
licensee's right to make copies is dependent upon the scope of the
license grant.
Courts have recognized the validity of innovative contracting
forms pioneered by the software industry such as shrinkwraps,
clickwraps, and browsewraps. With these agreements, assent to the
contract occurs after the physical manifestations that typically
indicate assent to a transaction. For example, a retail transaction is
typically complete (or the terms, such as the warranty and refund
terms, are established) when the consumer tenders payment.80 By
contrast, a consumer may purchase a software product, take the
product home, and still not assent to its terms until he unwraps the
74. The licensing model fulfilled legitimate industry needs, as it was not always clear
that copyright law protected software, and software is readily reproducible. See O'Rourke, supra
note 67, at 488-99; Oakley, supra note 62, at 1048-49.
75. See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
275, 316-19 (2003) (noting that consumers effectively have no other way to acquire software than
to license it).
76. The first sale doctrine permits the owner of a particular copy of a work to sell or
otherwise dispose of that copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (LexisNexis 2000).
77. Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1114-15
(2008) ("Since the software code is the licensor's intellectual property, protected by copyright law,
the licensor may distribute all, some, or none of the rights attaching to the property.").
78. Id. at 1111.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2000) (owners of a copy of a computer program may make copies
as an "essential step in the utilization of the computer program" or for "archival purposes").
80. See Kim, Clicking and Cringing, supra note 60, at 839-40 (noting that, under ProCD,
the "meaning assigned to the buyer's conduct would be determined by the agreement contained
within the box" rather than the conduct determining the existence of an agreement); Lemley,
Terms of Use, supra note 61, at 468-69; Deborah W. Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common
Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1205, 1226 (2000)
(criticizing the ProCD decision as contrary to existing contract and commercial law).
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shrinkwrap, thus completing the transaction.81 The software industry
thus established a different way of doing business8 2 that it termed"contracting," although it did not accord with the traditional law
governing contract formation. In this manner, software producers
used the bargaining power given to them by the background law of
copyright law to create market power and thereby subvert the
traditional contracting process.
There are several problems with this subversion. First, the
take-it-or-leave-it nature of licensing agreements shares similarities
with other contracts of adhesion8 3 and raises difficult issues of
individual autonomy and consumer choice.8 4 Second, the market
power that the background law accords to software producers could
also undermine the law's objective to encourage innovation and
reward creators. Copyright law gives creativity an economic currency
by enabling creators to transfer, sell, or assign their rights through a
written agreement. Software companies have used that currency to
force acceptance of wrap agreements 85 as written contracts, even
though most consumers never read them.8 6 These wrap agreements
may also require consumers to relinquish their rights to their
creations, and many do so unwittingly.
81. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
buyer accepted the software "after having an opportunity to read the license" after payment for
the product).
82. Products to consumers are typically purchased outright and governed by the first
sale doctrine and the Uniform Commercial Code. See Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma,
supra note 77 (explaining how the classification of a transaction as a license or a sale determines
which regulatory regime governs, which default rules apply, and what rights and remedies are
available to each party).
83. Contracts of adhesion are non-negotiable standard form agreements offered to
parties that lack bargaining power. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983).
84. Edwin Patterson described an insurance policy as one that an insured "adheres" to
because he has no ability to negotiate its terms. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-
Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
85. This Essay refers to shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap agreements together as
'wrap agreements."
86. See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 743 (2002)
(noting that "consumers typically do not read their standard form"); see also Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1986); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of
Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263,
1265-66 (1993) (discussing reasons why consumers do not read form agreements); Shmuel I.
Becher and Esther Unger-Aviram, Myth and Reality in Consumer Contracting Behavior
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that "the vast majority of consumers do not intend to read the
entire [standard form contract] they enter" but that they may "read parts of or skim" them),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443908, at 14.
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1. Scenario 5: Creative Consumer and Corporate Website
A consumer logs on to a web site to create an electronic
greeting card. A clickwrap agreement appears and the consumer
clicks "I ACCEPT"' without reading the terms. The clickwrap
agreement states that the consumer assigns all rights to the materials
that the consumer creates to the corporation that owns the web site.
Six months later, the consumer finds that his grinning image, the
same one that he had included in his electronic greeting card, is now
advertising that corporation's services on various web sites. When the
consumer calls to complain and to request the removal of his image
from the corporation's advertising, the corporation informs him that
he expressly permitted such use when he clicked "I ACCEPT"
underneath the clickwrap agreement.8 7
Last year, I received an electronic greeting card that contained
images of dancing elves with my sister and her family members' faces
replacing those of the elves. The image was so humorous that I
thought I might want to create one myself so I clicked on the link that
said, "Elf yourself," which brought me to the Office Max "ElfYourself'
website.88 After reading the promotional materials, and just prior to
uploading the images, a clickwrap agreement appeared. Unlike my
sister-and, most likely, many other consumers-I actually read the
terms. One of the provisions stated:
2.5 Grant of License to Registrant Content. By posting Registrant Content to the
Website or by otherwise submitting Registrant Content to us, Registrants automatically
grant, and represent and warrant that they have the right to grant to Office Max, a non-
exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, sublicensable (through multiple tiers), assignable, fully
paid, royalty-free, worldwide license to use, copy, modify, publish, make, sell, create
derivative works of or incorporate into other works such Registrant Content, derive
revenue or other remuneration from, communicate to the public, distribute (through
multiple tiers), perform or display such Registrant Content (in whole or in part) and/or
to incorporate such Registrant Content in other works in any form, media, or technology
now known or later developed.., for any purpose, including for purposes of advertising
and publicity on the Website and elsewhere. Office Max shall not be limited in any way
in its use, commercial or otherwise, of any such Registrant Content .... Further, we
have the explicit right to incorporate any Registrant Content posted to the Website ...
87. The hypothetical, while fictitious, is similar to a situation where a teenaged girl's
picture was used by a mobile phone company without her or the photographer's permission.
Virgin Mobile sued over Flickr image used in ad, September 20, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20896643/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). The photographer had
uploaded a picture of the teenager to Flickr, a photosharing website, pursuant to a Creative
Commons license. Id. Unknown to the photographer, the Creative Commons license permitted
the photograph to be used for commercial purposes. Id. The phone company used the photograph
of the smiling teenager in an advertisement with the words "Dump your pen friend" over her
picture. Id. Also included at the bottom of the ad were the words, "Free text virgin to virgin." Id.
88. ElfYourself by OfficeMax, www.elfyourself.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
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into any further work, in any medium, without prior consent or review, and without
payment of any royalty or fee whatsoever. 89
In other words, by simply taking advantage of their dancing elf offer,
the consumer offers the digital images of himself and his family for
Office Max to use in advertising and in any other way it wants-
forever. The consumer has, true to the company's word, "elfed"
himself.
B. Two Strategies to Contain Market Power
One solution to market power imbalances (and the resultant
contractual surprises) addresses the role of the judiciary in enforcing"wrap agreements." Courts have recognized the validity of novel
contracting forms in order to support the needs of the fledgling
software industry.90 Software producers (including, for the purposes
of this Essay, websites) have responded to this judicial accommodation
of wrap agreements by overreaching and inserting terms that do more
than establish the scope of the license grant. Not only do these terms
draw boundaries around the rights and responsibilities of the parties
with respect to the use of the licensed product, but they also wrest
from the licensee rights that are unrelated to the use of the subject
matter of the license agreement. For example, a license to use
Friendster.com's social networking website purportedly gives the
company "an irrevocable, perpetual, nonexclusive, fully-paid and
worldwide license to use, copy, perform, display and distribute"91 any
content posted by the user and "to prepare derivative works of, or
incorporate into other works, such Content and to grant and authorize
sublicenses of the foregoing."92  Thus, Friendster's browsewrap
agreement does more than merely govern the user's ability to use the
website. It also allows the website to use the content that the user
posted for purposes unrelated to the user's social networking profile.
A website such as Friendster typically does not do so, but as the web
environment changes and user generated content becomes more
sophisticated and valuable, this may change. Unfortunately for the
user, he has already granted broad use rights to the website through
the site's wrap agreement, something he may not be aware of until the
environment shifts and the website starts exploiting user content.
89. ElfYourself Terms of Service, http://www.elfyourself.com/termsofuse.php (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009) (on file with author).
90. See discussion supra Part H.A.
91. Friendster Terms of Service, http://www.friendster.comlinfo/tos.php (last visited Oct.
9, 2009).
92. Id.
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Because social networking sites would have already established
industry norms (through wrap agreements) granting them broad use
rights, the user would discover that it is futile to move to a site with
more favorable terms because all sites would offer the same terms.93
Furthermore, even if the user did manage to find a site with more
favorable terms, he may find it too burdensome to move his contacts
and content over to that new location since he has already established
a presence and a following on the original site. The user then may
simply refrain from creating and posting additional works, which
undermines the incentive objective of copyright law.
Courts have accommodated the business needs of software
producers and encouraged industry growth by enforcing novel
contracting forms that did not strictly conform to rules of contract
formation. This accommodation reflects an admirable awareness of
business realities; however, courts should also acknowledge the
realities of market power imbalance. Market power gives licensors of
software (and websites) the ability to dictate contractual terms. In
evaluating the validity of wrap agreements, courts should consider not
just their form, but also their substance. To consider the substantive
terms of wrap agreements in this context means more than
invalidating only those agreements and/or provisions with harsh, one-
sided terms. Courts should balance the needs of the software industry
with the disadvantages of these novel contracting forms (which often
do not require actual assent by the licensee) by enforcing only those
terms that govern the use of the software or website and not those
terms that deprive licensees of rights that are unrelated to their use of
licensed subject matter.94
The second strategy to alleviate the contracting inequities that
result from market power imbalance requires that efforts be made by
licensees themselves. While an individual licensee or user may have
little or no bargaining power, the aggregated influence of all licensees
of a particular product or website may level the market power
imbalance. One way licensees can mobilize and address market power
imbalances is by harnessing the power of the Internet to raise
awareness of unfair contract terms. For example, when Facebook
recently changed its terms of use, purportedly to give the company
perpetual ownership of user content, a coalition of consumer advocacy
93. See Mueller, supra note 7, at 580.
94. See Kim, Clicking and Cringing, supra note 60, at 810-36 (discussing different levels
of assent and advocating for selective enforcement of terms).
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groups and users organized an angry online campaign that succeeded
in preventing the implementation of the changes. 95
III. CONCLUSION
In considering the enforceability of contracts, courts and other
dispute resolution entities should consider not only the relative socio-
economic status of the parties but also the effect of the background
law as a "gap filler" when the bargaining context changes. These
entities should focus on the intent that the parties had when they
entered into the agreement, being ever mindful that the background
law may result in unintended consequences that not only defeat the
reasonable expectations of the parties but also may undermine the
objectives of copyright law itself.
95. Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, Facebook Withdraws Changes in Data Use, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/technology/internet/19facebook.html.
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